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 1. Introduction 
 
The results achieved in recent years by the theory of product differentiation may well 
explain its increasing relevance in the analysis of industrial organization and in the 
study of the sources of market power. The theory rests on the idea that in the presence 
of a differentiated demand, the strategic interaction among firms develops along two 
lines: the prices charged and the characteristics chosen by a firm and its competitors. 
One of the most investigated topics in this field is the analysis of locational equilibria in 
a horizontally differentiated market. The horizontal Hotelling model has been widely 
used in order to discuss problems related to the spatial price competition, the optimal 
product attributes, the optimal plant location, etc., and has found applications in the 
spatial economics literature, as well as in trade and banking theory. These models 
primarily focus on the existence of a Principle of Maximal or Minimum Differentiation 
(Economides 1986). This existence problem amounts to asking whether the interplay 
between the structure of consumers' preferences for the differentiated product and the 
optimal strategic behaviour of firms results into too little or too much product diversity. 
Following Hotelling (1929), D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) 
established a Principle of M aximal Differentiation, by assuming that the intensity of 
consumer preferences for their ideal product may be reformulated in a locational setup 
in terms of quadratic transportation costs: in a duopoly market, the firms try to set up 
apart from each other  - differentiate at most their product  - in order to relax price 
competition. This finding sharply contrasts with the acclaimed Principle of Minimum 
Differentiation of the original Hotelling model where firms, in the presence of linear 
transportation costs, choose to cluster in the product space. Examples of the tendency 
for competitors to reduce differences in distance or in the product characteristics space 
can be easily found in the real world. Conversely, examples of maximal differentiation 
can be identified in a truly locational perspective - e.g. the attitude for shopping centers 
and supermarkets to locate outside the urban center - but it is much more difficult to 
observe maximal differentiation in the characteristics space. The existence of a greater 
or a lower differentiation clearly depends on the interplay of a price competition effect 
and a demand effect: when the latter prevails, the firms' strategies are found to exhibit a 
strong tendency towards agglomeration in the middle; by contrast, when the demand 
effect is outweighed by the price competition effect, moving away is the optimal 
behaviour. Recently, this debate has been extended to cover situations with ‘low’   3
demand (Hinloopen and van Marrewijk 1999, Chirco, Lambertini and Zagonari, 2003) 
and to multi-dimensional models (Caplin and Nalebuff 1986, Neven and Thisse 1990, 
Tabuchi 1994). 
One common property of traditional locational models is the assumption that 
consumers are uniformly distributed over the characteristics space; with a few 
exceptions, the situations in which the consumers' preferences are concentrated on a 
subsection of the available varieties have been neglected. In these cases one would 
expect that competitors produce fairly similar types of products, in order to better match 
the  tastes of the relatively largest share of consumers (Beath and Katsoulacos 1991). 
The problem of the optimal prices and locations has been explicitly solved by Tabuchi 
and Thisse (1995) with a triangular and symmetric distribution. They show that, given 
that distribution, any symmetric location around the middle cannot be an equilibrium. 
Indeed, two asymmetric equilibria arise, characterized by strong product differentiation 
between the firms, with one of them locating outside the support of the customer 
distribution.Their results, however, heavily depend on the non differentiability of the 
consumers density function, which generates a discontinuity of the reaction functions in 
correspondence of any symmetric location. 
In this paper, we aim at extending Tabuchi and Thisse analysis in two directions. 
We offer a simple parametrization of the degree of consumers’ concentration around the 
middle - which include the uniform and the triangular distribution as limit cases. This 
allows us to solve the price-location problem as a function of the degree of consumers 
concentration. Within this setup, we are able to show that a symmetric equilibrium 
exists, provided the density is differentiable at the center of its support. Moreover, we 
are able to give some theoretical  support to the idea that a higher concentration of 
consumers around the center induces firms to reduce the optimal product differentiation. 
Finally, we find that the asymmetric equilibria identified by Tabuchi and Thisse may 
arise for a lower degree of consumers concentration than that implied by the triangular 
distribution and that these asymmetric equilibria may coexist with a symmetric one. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic model and 
discuss the simple parametrization  of consumers' concentration adopted in the sequel. 
The explicit solution of the price-location problem is presented in section 3. Some 
comments and concluding remarks are provided in Section 4. 
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2. The model 
 
Let us consider a market for a horizontally differentiated product, where the population 
of consumers is normalized to 1. Consumers, indexed with x, are distributed over the 
interval [ 0,1], according to a density f( x,w), where the parameter w that can be viewed 
as a concentration index of the consumers’ tastes. More precisely, the density f( x,w) is 
characterized as follows: 
 
( ) [ ]
( ) [ ] 1 , 0 for 1 2 2 2 0 ,
1 , 0 for 1 1 ,
˛ - - =
˛ =




for 0 < w < 1 
     
( )
( )
















































   
 
 
Figure 1: The density function for different values of the concentration parameter   5
As shown in Figure 1, f(x,w) is symmetric around  x = 1/2; for w = 1 it describes a 
uniform distribution while, as w decreases it concentrates towards the middle becoming 
trapezoidal and collapsing to a triangle for w = 0. Roughly speaking, our density is a 
trapezoid, with longest base equal to 1, shortest base equal to w and altitudo equal to 
w + 1
2































In this framework we consider a duopoly model in which both firms, firm 1 and 
firm 2, produce a differentiated product at a constant and equal to zero marginal cost. 
The location x chosen by each firm represents the good it decides to produce: the ideal 
consumer’s product may match with the product offered, otherwise consumers choose 
to buy a ‘less than ideal’ product paying a transportation cost that we consider quadratic 
in distance. Each consumer takes at most one unit of the product, so that total demand 
for the good offered by the firm located in  x is given by the number of customers it 
patronizes. In the sequel we shall assume full market coverage. 
Let us denote with  a the distance of firm 1 from the origin, while  b is the 
distance of firm 2. In order to exclude the possibility of leapfrogging by either firms we 
assume a <  b  - where  ( ) +¥ ¥ - ˛ , a  and  ( ) +¥ ¥ - ˛ , b  -  and the marginal consumer 
lying between the two firms. As is well known, the price-location problem is a two-
stage game in which at the first stage the firms choose their location and at the second 
stage choose their prices. The game is simultaneous. 
The optimal firms' behaviour obviously differs according to the value of w. The 
results in terms of optimal locations are well known in the literature when w = 1 and 
when  w  = 0: in the unconstrained Hotelling game with a uniform distribution of 
consumers the firms maximize profits by locating at  -1/4 e 5/4 (Lambertini, 1994); 
moreover, Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) demonstrate that with a triangular distribution 
two asymmetric equilibria arise,  ( ) 18 6 5 , 9 6 -  and  ( ) 9 6 1 , 18 6 5 1 + - . The 
following analysis will focus on the price-location equilibria for intermediate values of 
the parameter w, i.e. when the density becomes trapezoidal. 
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3. Consumer concentration and equilibrium prices and locations 
 
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium through backward induction, solving first 
for the prices and then for the locations as a function of the exogenous parameter w and 
the optimal prices determined in the first stage. Notice that if firm 1 and 2 set a price 
respectively equal to  1 p  and   2 p  being located respectively in  a and  b, the above 
hypotheses on transportation costs, unit demand and full market coverage imply that the 




















1           (1) 
  
Clearly, given the shape of our density, the firms' reaction functions in both stages of 
the game will be different according to the fact that the firms know that their behaviour 
implies that the marginal consumer lies in the ‘central interval’ or in the two external 





























- external intervals. We solve the model under both conjectures and verify under which 
conditions one or more equilibria exist in which conjectures are fulfilled. Notice that, 
given the simmetry of the density, the possible existence of a subgame perfect 










z  implies the existence of a specular equilibrium, 









. This allows to restrict the analysis to one external area only. 
 
3.1 The marginal consumer lies in the central interval 
 
Given the hypothesis of unit consumers’ demand and given our normalization, the 
market demand for each good corresponds to its market share. Therefore, the demand 
for the two firms are respectively:  
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so that, by substituting (1), we get:  
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3.1.1 The price stage 
 
By differentiating the firms' profit functions and solving the first order condition with 
0respect to prices, we find the following reaction functions:    8
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The Nash equilibrium in prices is therefore:  
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3.1.2 The location stage 
 
Substituting the optimal prices in (4) and (5) , profits are expressed as a function of 
locations and w:  
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* + = . If firms locate in  a* and b*, their optimal prices are 








1 + + = =  and the indifferent consumer is located in 1/2: the conjecture 
that the indifferent consumer lies in the central area is fulfilled. We can therefore 
establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. For all values of  ( ] 1 , 0 ˛ w  there exist a subgame perfect symmetric Nash 
equilibrium in prices and locations. 
 
Notice that the optimal locations coincide with those identified in Lambertini (1994), 
4 1 - = a  and  4 5 = a , when w = 1. The optimal prices are increasing in  w: a higher 
degree of concentration around the midlle (lower w) induces firms to move inwards in 
order to match the tastes of a growing share of consumers: the more concentrated is the 
consumer distribution, the less the firms differentiate their products.. This reduced 
differentiation strenghten price competition. The overall equilibrium shows clearly a 
dominance of the demand effect:  the advantage of acquiring the consumers in the 
central area dominates the advantage of softening competition through a large product 
differentiation. 
 
3.2 The marginal consumer lies in one of the external intervals 
 
Now we want to verify whether there exist subgame perfect equilibria, such that the 








. In this interval the 













z , the demand for firm 1 is:  
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Substituting (1) in the above expression we obtain the following demand functions in 
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3.2.1 The price stage 
 
The first and second order conditions for profit maximization with respect to firm 1’s 
price are satisfied by the following reaction function:
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a b p p - + =              (10)   11
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The solution of the system (10) and (11) gives the following Nash equilibrium in prices:  
 
   ( ) a b p - = r 1  
  ( )
2 2
1 3 b a a b p - + - = r  
 
where  r  is a root of the polynomial   ( ) ( ) 1 2 8
2 2 - + + - w x b a x . 
The existence of two solutions demonstrates that the reaction functions intersect 
twice. Since the two roots of the polynomial are  
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we may establish that these intersections occur at the following two price couples:  
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using solution  1 x , or  
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using solution  2 x . It must be noticed, however, that only (14) and (15) entail positive 
prices at equilibrium for both firms. Therefore this is the only economically meaningful 
economic solution to the price game. 
 
3.2.2 The location stage 
 
The profit functions calculated at the optimal prices are:  
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By differentiating firm 1’s profits with respect to its location, we get the following first 
order condition: 
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which gives the optimal location:
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If we now differentiate firm 2’s profits with respect to its location, and substitute the 
reaction function (16), tedious calculations (see the Appendix) show that we can 
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Therefore, equations (17) and (18) give the optimal locations as a function of w, under 










We now have to verify whether there is a range of w such that this conjecture is 
actually fulfilled. We first notice that when w = 0 - i.e. when the density describing the 
consumers' preferences is a symmetric triangle - the equations (17) and (18) collapse to 
9 6 - = a and  18 6 5 = b , that correspond exactly to Tabuchi and Thisse’s solutions. 
In general, when evaluated at the optimal locations (17) and (18), the price equations 
(14) and (15) become respectively:  
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By substituting in (17)-(20) into (1), we find the marginal consumer’s location as a 
function of w:  
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This allows us to establish that the firms' conjectures generating the asymmetric 
equilibrium (17)-(20) are fulfilled if  



















i.e., if  5 1 < w . By a similar reasoning, it can be proved that, under the same condition 
on w, a specular asymmetric equilibrium exists, with the marginal consumer lying in the 
right external interval, with firms located respectively at  ( ) 18 1 6 5 1
2 w a - - = and 
( ) 9 1 6
2 w b - = . We can therefore establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. For  5 1 0 < < w  there exist three subgame perfect Nash equilibria in 
prices and locations, a symmetric equilibrium and two asymmetric ones. 
 
Notice that in the asymmetric equilibria one firm locates outside the market area, while 
the other locates in the external interval opposite to that in which lies the marginal 







, 0 , both firms move inwards. 
Given w, the firm locating within the market area may charge higher prices and enjoy 
higher profits. 
It may be interesting to ask what happens when  5 1 = w . In this case, the 
asymmetric equilibria defined above make the marginal consumer fall in 2/5, or 
specularly in 3/5, i.e. in correspondence of the hedges of the density function. This is a 
situation similar to that Tabuchi and Thisse describe with respect to a possible 
symmetric equilibrium: since the density is not differentiable, the reaction functions are 
indeed discontinuous. 
Let us assume that the solution (17)-(20) holds for  5 1 = w . Then the following 
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In order to ensure that it is indeed an equilibrium, we must exclude the profitability of 
unilateral deviations from the candidate equilibrium location, in correspondence of the 
admissible prices for such a location. Let us define the alternative location for firm 1:  
   e + - =
15
4
' a  
If firm 1 locates in  a’, while firm 2 locates in 2/3, the marginal consumer lies in the 
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When evaluated at these prices, and at  e + - =
15
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' a , and 
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= b , the profits of firm 1 
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for arbitrarily small positive values of  e. This is enough to prove that, for  5 1 = w , the 
solutions (17)-(20) are not subgame perfect equilibria and allows us to establish that for 
5 1 = w  there exists only a subgame perfect symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices and 
locations, defined by equations (6)-(9). 
 
4. Remarks and conclusions 
 
In this paper we have analysed the effects of the consumers' concentration towards the 
middle of the space of product characteristics, in a a model of horizontal differentiation 
with quadratic transportation costs. The consumers' density is assumed to be symmetric 
and trapezoidal; if the size of the market is normalized to 1, this allows to consider the 
lenght of the shortest base as a mean preserving spread of consumers' preferences. 
Clearly, the traditional uniform distribution and a symmetric triangular distribution can 
be nested into this setup as limit cases.   16
We have proved that as far as the shortest base is positive - i.e. the distribution is 
differentiable at 1/2 - a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists in the two 
stage price-location game. The result we achieve is rather intuitive: starting from the 
optimal solution obtained under the standard uniform distribution, as preferences 
become more concentrated around the middle, both firms move inwards and reduce the 
degree of product differentiation. This clearly reinforces price competition and results in 
lower equilibrium  prices. This result is consistent with a more general intuition that 
homogeneity of consumers might have important implications in terms of reducing the 
firms'market power (Benassi, Chirco and Scrimitore, 2002). 
Moreover, our discussion shows that the asymmetric equilibria identified by 
Tabuchi and Thisse may coexist with the above symmetric equilibrium. For a relevant 
range of values of our mean preserving spread parameter – when preferences become 
sufficiently concentrated - two asymmetric subgame perfect equilibria appear, with one 
firm producing a relatively ‘average’ product, and the other firm choosing to locate 
outside the characteristics space. Once one firm decides to produce a product which 
meets the taste of the large share of consumers located around the middle, the other firm 
finds it optimal to avoid a destructive price competition by choosing a product with 
‘extreme’ and ‘out of market’ characteristics. However, this peculiar location choice 
requires that a low price is charged, in order to capture at least the consumers located at 
the nearest tail of the distribution. This solution is such that as w increases within its 
admissible range – the distribution becomes more dispersed - both firms locate inwards 
and decrease their price. As the relative weight of the tails increases, the firm producing 
outside the market area perceives an incentive to make its product more attractive for 
the growing share of consumers it may patronize – those located at its nearest tail. The 
firm producing inside the m arket area, perceiving no competition at the other tail, 
challenges its rival by locating further towards the middle. These movements result in a 
tougher price competition. 
While the simple setup discussed in this paper allows for an explicit general 
solution which covers the situations previously discussed in the literature, it is 
nevertheless clear that the relation between any concentration index of the consumers' 
preferences and the properties of equilibria should be framed in a more general setting, 
independently of the possibility of defining analytical solutions. This is an important 
issue of the research agenda on product differentiation. 
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Appendix 
 
By solving with respect to b the first order condition for firm 2’s profit maximization at 
the location stage, we obtain the following critical values 
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•  r = b , where r is a root of the polynomial: 
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Let us consider these solutions. 
 




w a b - + - = . Given the reaction function of 
firm 1, we have to solve the following system in order to discuss the candidate 
optimal locations of firm 1 and firm 2:  
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first couple implies a value for  b lower than  a. This solution is therefore 
unacceptable. However, if eqts (14) and (15) were evaluated at the second couple, 













> - is always satisfied, at this solution the firms' conjectures would 
not be fulfilled. 
 




w a b - - - = , the values of  b that solve the 
system of the two reaction functions are both smaller than a. This contradicts the 
assumption a < b. 
 
We now consider the polynomial (A1). Its solutions obtained by substituting firm 1’s 
optimal reply are:  
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2 - = w x  
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•  We can immediately rule out the complex solution  ( ) 1 2
2 - = w x . 








w a - - = . In this 
case a < b, but both optimal solutions are negative and this contrasts again with the 
conjectures about the location of the marginal consumer. 









w a - - = .  Using these optimal locations into (14) and (15) we may verify 
that the marginal consumers is in the left external interval for  5 1 < w . Notice that 
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1 The first order condition is satisfied also by  
 
2 2
2 1 a b p p - + = . 
 
However, at this solution the second order condition for a maximum is not satisfied for w < 1. 
 
2 Again, we have two solutions satisfying the FOC. The other solution  
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does not satisfies the second order condition. 
 
3 The above FOC has two solutions. The other is 
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